There is little doubt that the wave of economic globalization over the past several decades have been generally good. Overall poverty has dramatically decreased, productivity has increased in just about every global industry, and consumers everywhere benefit. This is not to say that globalization has been all good everywhere; after all, every economic scenario has some losers. Even in the United States, the world's largest economy, people have some preoccupations surrounding this seemingly endless globalization.
The chief concerns among Americans regarding this subject, or at least the most highly publicized ones, are illegal immigration and outsourcing. These are seen as the two principle threats to the American worker. While these are symptoms of a more competitive global economy, a closer understanding of international economics shows that neither one is as serious a threat as it is perceived to be.
Let's start with illegal immigration. Harvard economist George Borjas released a study in 2005 that showed that the presence of illegal immigrants in the United States reduces the wages of High School dropouts by 8.2 percent. Taken by itself, this information seems to show that Americans should be concerned about illegal immigration, at least if they didn't finish High School. But even Professor Borjas himself has acknowledged slight ambiguities to his study. Yes, illegal immigrants exert downward pressure on unskilled labor wages, but in a world as globalized as ours, it is probably safe to say that companies that are so starved for cheap labor might just pack up and move to the source of that labor if they did not receive illegal immigrants here. Take a look at our border with Mexico. The Mexican side is packed with maquilas; factories that are usually owned by US companies but employ cheap Mexican labor. Maquilas first began to spring up on the border in the 1960s as a direct result of the termination of the Bracero Program, which allowed many unskilled Mexicans to travel and work to the United States. Many companies are so starved for cheap labor that they will go to it if it does not come to them.
Illegal immigration also brings some benefits. As economists such as David Card from UC Berkley point out, the increase in US population naturally increases the demand for goods, which drives industries and creates other jobs. This is a bit difficult to track, but we can say for certain that by providing cheap labor, illegal immigrants do provide lower expenses for companies that hire them, which translate into lower prices for their customers. Those of us who are not High School dropouts, therefore, might just benefit. Those of us who are most likely have a whole slew of financial problems beyond illegal immigration- however, that is either an issue of education or of welfare, not of immigration.
Outsourcing is also much less of a threat than it appears to be. While many complain about companies outsourcing to foreign countries, few realize that many jobs are outsourced to the United States- more than any other country, in fact. A study by the National Center for Policy Analysis (see below) revealed that while there was a 23 percent increase in outsourcing from 1989-2004, there was also an 82 percent increase in "insourcing" during the same period. That is to say, the US gains more employment from outsourcing than it loses. In the global marketplace, American workers are still seen as more efficient in the majority of industries, and as such they will be sought out by foreign as well as American firms.
I don't want to sound like there is no downside of globalization for the US. Open markets make it easier for the most efficient producers to dominate their respective markets, which sometime is not the US. Chilean companies will dominate the market on copper and Ecuadorian companies will dominate the market on bananas. However, at least for the time being, US companies will dominate the market on computer chips.
http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba480
Friday, June 17, 2011
Monday, May 23, 2011
The US and Israel: My Take
With all that has been going on in Israel and Palestine lately, I figured I should seize the opportunity to voice my long-held opinions on US-Israeli relations. But first some background.
In 2007, a book came out by Harvard professor Stephen Walt and University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer (two of the biggest names in the field of international relations) about US-Israeli relations called The Israel Lobby. As you may have guessed, the book centers around the influence of the extremely powerful pro-Israel Lobby on US policy decisions (the lobby is made up of a loose coalition of groups and individuals, the largest of which are the Christians United for Israel, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations), and eventually concludes that the lobby forces US policymakers into adopting unconditionally pro-Israel stances that ultimately undermine the United States' position in the Middle East. The book has been received with more than its fair share of controversy, and I highly recommend reading it if you are at all interested in the topic.
The publicity of The Israel Lobby ignited the debate around Israeli-US relations like never before. On one side, there were those who called for increased awareness of the lobby's power and a much more conditional bond with Israel. On the other side, were those who believed that the lobby's power was greatly exaggerated and that the US could not afford to break relations with Israel on any level. The debate was not over whether Palestine deserved statehood or whether the lobby should be disallowed, but rather over whether the US should continue its "special" relationship with Israel. The debate has calmed down in recent years, but recent protests by Palestinian demonstrators on Israel's border with Gaza, the Golan Heights, and Lebanon have once again brought the Israeli issue to light.
This time around, there are new factors at play. Critics of US-Israeli relations have said in the past that by supporting Israel, the US is inflaming Arab countries who despise the state of Israel. However, after the Arab Spring, Israel advocates say that clearly Arab populations are more concerned over the oppression from their own governments than they are about Israel.
It's a convincing argument, but it's also much too broad. While Egyptians and Libyans certainly cared more about their own government, this may be because they had less of a stake in the Israeli issue. Lebanese, Syrians, and Jordanians, on the other hand, may be much more effected. Let us not forget that the protesters on Sunday came from the Syrian and Lebanese sides of the border, after all. It may be true that the governments of these Arab countries are using this as a distraction from domestic issues, but in the end, even if the population of every Arab country is more concerned with its own government than it is with Israel, that doesn't mean they are not concerned with Israel at all. And if Israel continues to commit human rights atrocities, like firing on unarmed protesters two weeks ago, Israeli brutality is likely to jump higher and higher on this list.
But let me return to the relationship between Israel and the United States. While US presidents have, on occasion, condemned Israel's actions, they have almost never followed up with real diplomatic pressure. When the Israeli soldiers raided an unarmed aid flotilla destined for Gaza, President Obama personally condemned the action, but he later instructed the US representative to the United Nations to block the resolution to condemn the acts and conduct an impartial international investigation into the incident. Historically, Israel has been able to count on practically unconditional US support.
As Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Oren points out, the Israel lobby is certainly not solely responsible for this support. Israel does have some intrinsic strategic value to the United States. Israel, with its powerful military and pro-US diplomatic stance, sometimes fights the United States' battles for it. Whenever I talk about Israel, I am reminded of my time serving as a representative on the Security Council in the American Model United Nations conference in Chicago. In this simulation, Israel bombed Iranian nuclear facilities after the UN failed to persuade Iran to discontinue its nuclear program. This created a diplomatic catastrophe, but through its actions Israel was able to achieve what the UN and the US delegation had failed to do: destroy Iran's nuclear capability. While this was a completely fabricated situation, it was not entirely unrealistic, and it nicely illustrates the role that Israel serves for the US in the Middle East. Israel is sometimes willing to undertake actions that the US is unwilling to, and the US can avoid a certain amount of accountability for these actions by condemning Israel, even though Israel may have been acting in the best interests of the United States.
Still, Israel's actions rarely incur more than a tongue-lashing from US Presidents, and military aid continues to flow there. Judging from his speech on Thursday, Obama seems to recognize the awkward position the US is put in because of its support for Israel. His insistence that Israel pull back to its 1967 borders was a bold move, and it is one that is sure to cause friction between himself and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. However, it will be interesting to see if Obama backs his words up with actions, as this would represent a huge shift in US foreign policy. I believe this shift should be seriously considered. If the Arab Spring becomes a permanent movement, then as despotic Middle Eastern dictators are forced out of power, the people of the Middle East will begin to see Israel as the cause of most unwarranted violence. That is, of course, unless such violent actions can be deterred. And if such actions are to be deterred, it must be Israel and the US that do so.
You can read more opinions on this issue here: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/25/the_ultimate_ally
In 2007, a book came out by Harvard professor Stephen Walt and University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer (two of the biggest names in the field of international relations) about US-Israeli relations called The Israel Lobby. As you may have guessed, the book centers around the influence of the extremely powerful pro-Israel Lobby on US policy decisions (the lobby is made up of a loose coalition of groups and individuals, the largest of which are the Christians United for Israel, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations), and eventually concludes that the lobby forces US policymakers into adopting unconditionally pro-Israel stances that ultimately undermine the United States' position in the Middle East. The book has been received with more than its fair share of controversy, and I highly recommend reading it if you are at all interested in the topic.
The publicity of The Israel Lobby ignited the debate around Israeli-US relations like never before. On one side, there were those who called for increased awareness of the lobby's power and a much more conditional bond with Israel. On the other side, were those who believed that the lobby's power was greatly exaggerated and that the US could not afford to break relations with Israel on any level. The debate was not over whether Palestine deserved statehood or whether the lobby should be disallowed, but rather over whether the US should continue its "special" relationship with Israel. The debate has calmed down in recent years, but recent protests by Palestinian demonstrators on Israel's border with Gaza, the Golan Heights, and Lebanon have once again brought the Israeli issue to light.
This time around, there are new factors at play. Critics of US-Israeli relations have said in the past that by supporting Israel, the US is inflaming Arab countries who despise the state of Israel. However, after the Arab Spring, Israel advocates say that clearly Arab populations are more concerned over the oppression from their own governments than they are about Israel.
It's a convincing argument, but it's also much too broad. While Egyptians and Libyans certainly cared more about their own government, this may be because they had less of a stake in the Israeli issue. Lebanese, Syrians, and Jordanians, on the other hand, may be much more effected. Let us not forget that the protesters on Sunday came from the Syrian and Lebanese sides of the border, after all. It may be true that the governments of these Arab countries are using this as a distraction from domestic issues, but in the end, even if the population of every Arab country is more concerned with its own government than it is with Israel, that doesn't mean they are not concerned with Israel at all. And if Israel continues to commit human rights atrocities, like firing on unarmed protesters two weeks ago, Israeli brutality is likely to jump higher and higher on this list.
But let me return to the relationship between Israel and the United States. While US presidents have, on occasion, condemned Israel's actions, they have almost never followed up with real diplomatic pressure. When the Israeli soldiers raided an unarmed aid flotilla destined for Gaza, President Obama personally condemned the action, but he later instructed the US representative to the United Nations to block the resolution to condemn the acts and conduct an impartial international investigation into the incident. Historically, Israel has been able to count on practically unconditional US support.
As Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Oren points out, the Israel lobby is certainly not solely responsible for this support. Israel does have some intrinsic strategic value to the United States. Israel, with its powerful military and pro-US diplomatic stance, sometimes fights the United States' battles for it. Whenever I talk about Israel, I am reminded of my time serving as a representative on the Security Council in the American Model United Nations conference in Chicago. In this simulation, Israel bombed Iranian nuclear facilities after the UN failed to persuade Iran to discontinue its nuclear program. This created a diplomatic catastrophe, but through its actions Israel was able to achieve what the UN and the US delegation had failed to do: destroy Iran's nuclear capability. While this was a completely fabricated situation, it was not entirely unrealistic, and it nicely illustrates the role that Israel serves for the US in the Middle East. Israel is sometimes willing to undertake actions that the US is unwilling to, and the US can avoid a certain amount of accountability for these actions by condemning Israel, even though Israel may have been acting in the best interests of the United States.
Still, Israel's actions rarely incur more than a tongue-lashing from US Presidents, and military aid continues to flow there. Judging from his speech on Thursday, Obama seems to recognize the awkward position the US is put in because of its support for Israel. His insistence that Israel pull back to its 1967 borders was a bold move, and it is one that is sure to cause friction between himself and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. However, it will be interesting to see if Obama backs his words up with actions, as this would represent a huge shift in US foreign policy. I believe this shift should be seriously considered. If the Arab Spring becomes a permanent movement, then as despotic Middle Eastern dictators are forced out of power, the people of the Middle East will begin to see Israel as the cause of most unwarranted violence. That is, of course, unless such violent actions can be deterred. And if such actions are to be deterred, it must be Israel and the US that do so.
You can read more opinions on this issue here: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/25/the_ultimate_ally
Saturday, May 14, 2011
Democracy in Ecuador: Way too Soon to Celebrate
Latin America is notorious for unstable democracies. The 1980s, termed the “lost decade” by many countries in the region, saw an unprecedented amount of civil wars and bloody coups. Many countries in Latin America still struggle with stability; in 2009 the Honduran military ousted president Manuel Zelaya and in 2010 the Ecuadorian police kidnapped President Rafael Correa.
Last November, I gave a presentation at Beloit College that touched on democratic stability in Ecuador. I concluded that the country has experienced a fundamental shift during Mr. Correa’s presidency that may lead to the establishment of much more sustainable government institutions. However, I also noted that the future of Ecuadorian politics rests squarely on Correa’s shoulders. The fact that Correa was able to come back to power after he was kidnapped proves that his administration is much more durable than that of any other Ecuadorian president of the decade (three presidents have been overthrown since 1997).
The big question, however, is why the Correa administration is so durable. Is he truly more serious about creating a sustainable democratic Ecuador, or is he simply better at manipulating the public and government institutions? It is very hard to say. While he has made some dynamic changes to Ecuador’s political culture, nearly all of these changes have also involved increasing his own power. In the past, I have argued that Correa is responsible enough to entrust with such power, at least for the time being. In any case, with a 65 percent approval rating and a backing from the majority of legislators, Correa’s administration is not going anywhere for now.
Much of Correa’s popularity is derived from the string of political victories he has scored with reform after reform. Shortly after taking office in 2007, he replaced Ecuador’s legislature and charged it with writing a new constitution. After his re-election in 2009, he reformed Ecuador’s educational system and public deficit, this time with much more resistance from students and government employees (this culminated in the police kidnapping). All of these reforms were successfully implemented in the end.
Correa’s most recent initiative was a public referendum that included 10 questions that asked voters their opinions on possible reforms. Among the most controversial of these reforms are the proposed overhaul of the court system and the passage of a new restrictive media law. Both of these reforms would give Correa substantially more power. While this troubled many of his critics, the voters responded positively to all ten questions, apparently giving Correa the legitimacy to follow through on his proposals.
So here we are again. Correa is expanding his power, but he is doing so with widespread popular support. It’s still difficult to determine what exactly his intentions are, but if Correa is to maintain his legitimacy, he would be wise to ease up on his restrictions on the media. His previous scuffles with the media have made him look like a dictator, especially in December of last year when he sent special police forces to raid the headquarters of Vanguardia, an Ecuadorian newspaper. Correa has publicly characterized Ecuador’s independent media outlets as “vultures,” and has fired back against them through lawsuits and by created his own media outlet, Ecuador TV.
I have lived in Ecuador before and I have read many of the major newspapers of the country. In my experience, the news media in Ecuador is indeed biased and inefficient, just as Correa asserts. However, there is no reason it needs to get shut down. Correa essentially uses Ecuador TV as a mouthpiece for his administration, and that should be enough for him. His battle against inefficient and biased media is transforming into a crusade against free press. In light of his extensive power and popularity, Correa may just be able to win this crusade, which would mean a major step backward for the legitimacy of the Ecuadorian government. A realistic vision for a democratically stable Ecuador exists, but it is a very delicate vision, and it depends entirely on Correa’s actions. If he sees his presidency through to its end by following the rules he has already established for himself, it may mean that a relatively stable, though certainly not uncorrupt, system has been created. However, if he decides to undermine the freedoms set up in the constitution that was created under his very watch (namely by shutting down free press), then it will mean that the entire political system will have to start over from about where it was more than a decade ago.
Saturday, May 7, 2011
The War in Libya: My Take
First of all, I would highly recommend anyone with the desire to learn more about this issue to check out foreignpolicy.com. There are a great collection of articles that make arguments both for and against intervention in Libya. For an international relations nerd like myself, Foreign Policy truly has a goldmine of literature on this topic in their website.
I generally consider myself to be of a Jeffersonian school of thought when it comes to US foreign policy. I think the US should be far more inward-looking and should leave national security up to the intelligence community more than the military so as not to get bogged down with multi-billion dollar attempts at nation building. However, I was not as opposed to intervention in Libya as you might think given these opinions. I like that Obama limited his intervention to aerial strikes and that he emphasized "leading from behind" (i.e. not leading at all) with NATO forces. He may draw criticism from those who claim that NATO forces won't be up to the task and that Qaddafi's removal is not possible without a full-scale ground invasion, but frankly, the alternative policy that these criticisms imply would be much worse. The US cannot afford another war (as long as there are no boots on the ground, I would argue that Libya falls far short of "war" classification), and ground troops would send the US on another years-long entanglement that would get us nowhere.
In his critique of American intervention, Harvard professor Stephen Walt explained that the US has no interests in Libya. That's almost true. Any country with oil reserves has some US interests in it, although I would agree that it is probably not enough to justify large scale intervention. In my opinion, the best thing the US has to gain out of intervention in Libya is favor with the revolutionary new governments that will (hopefully) be set up as a result of the Arab Spring. The US has a long history of foreign policy blunders in the region to atone for, and condemning Mubarak and Qaddafi at the last second is not enough to get on the good side of the revolutionaries. Sending aerial support, on the other hand, might just be. Unfortunately, there are no guarantees that this new wave of revolution will spread or even last in the countries it has taken root in. Although I am certainly not an expert on this topic, with Egypt set to have free elections, I am optimistic.
However, I am still inclined to take Stephen Walt's side in saying that the US has no major interests in Libya. The UN's goal of preventing civilian casualties should be the United States's goal as well, but instead that goal is the removal of Qaddafi (technically, this is NATO's goal, but the US has the same goal as a NATO member). While this is not exactly surprising, given the far-reaching history of US foreign policy, it is not smart either. The US has nothing to gain by ousting Qaddafi, but everything to lose by pursuing him with ground forces. Obama made a mistake by associating himself with the NATO objective: now, if NATO forces prove unwilling to accomplish it, he will look weak and ineffective. Obama should have vacated center stage to French Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy from the get-go. If NATO must go in after him, it should be regional powers like France that lead the way, not the US.
Before I conclude, I would also like to say that the most unfounded critique of Libyan intervention I have heard on various news outlets is the notion that now that Obama has made humanitarian intervention an essential part of his foreign policy he must also intervene in countries such as Sudan, Somolia, Democratic People's Republic of Congo, and the Ivory Coast. This notion is ridiculous. Not only would the US not be able to make a difference in any of these countries, intervention in these areas may actually worsen the current situations. Qaddafi's forces were bombed because Obama believed that such actions were capable of preventing bloodshed, not just because Qaddafi was a bad man. Obama has also been criticized for not intervening in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, even though there is civil unrest in these countries as well. But these countries are strategic allies in the war against Al-Qaeda. Selective morality is nothing new in the world of US foreign policy, and it is simply necessary to maintain strategic alliances.
On March 28th, an article in The Economist praised Obama's actions in Libya as "relatively extraordinary," saying, "He has in a mere 31 days since the protests started imposed powerful sanctions, frozen Colonel Qaddafi’s assets, secured a robust Security Council resolution, organised an international coalition, executed a near-flawless military campaign, rolled Colonel Qaddafi’s forces back to the west, taken out the colonel’s air defences and knocked out a good deal of his ground forces." Now, over a month later, this author may have changed his/her tune. Qaddafi is still holding on to power, and seems to be likely to do so as long as his bank account retains its weight. Still, while I wouldn't call Obama's Libyan intervention "extraordinary," I think he certainly made a shrewd foreign policy decision in a pinch. His emphasis on "humanitarian intervention" in a country with relatively few US interests, may liken him to his relatively unpopular predecessor, but his ability to avoid entanglement and promote multilateralism in this conflict proves he is at least logistically efficient.
I generally consider myself to be of a Jeffersonian school of thought when it comes to US foreign policy. I think the US should be far more inward-looking and should leave national security up to the intelligence community more than the military so as not to get bogged down with multi-billion dollar attempts at nation building. However, I was not as opposed to intervention in Libya as you might think given these opinions. I like that Obama limited his intervention to aerial strikes and that he emphasized "leading from behind" (i.e. not leading at all) with NATO forces. He may draw criticism from those who claim that NATO forces won't be up to the task and that Qaddafi's removal is not possible without a full-scale ground invasion, but frankly, the alternative policy that these criticisms imply would be much worse. The US cannot afford another war (as long as there are no boots on the ground, I would argue that Libya falls far short of "war" classification), and ground troops would send the US on another years-long entanglement that would get us nowhere.
In his critique of American intervention, Harvard professor Stephen Walt explained that the US has no interests in Libya. That's almost true. Any country with oil reserves has some US interests in it, although I would agree that it is probably not enough to justify large scale intervention. In my opinion, the best thing the US has to gain out of intervention in Libya is favor with the revolutionary new governments that will (hopefully) be set up as a result of the Arab Spring. The US has a long history of foreign policy blunders in the region to atone for, and condemning Mubarak and Qaddafi at the last second is not enough to get on the good side of the revolutionaries. Sending aerial support, on the other hand, might just be. Unfortunately, there are no guarantees that this new wave of revolution will spread or even last in the countries it has taken root in. Although I am certainly not an expert on this topic, with Egypt set to have free elections, I am optimistic.
However, I am still inclined to take Stephen Walt's side in saying that the US has no major interests in Libya. The UN's goal of preventing civilian casualties should be the United States's goal as well, but instead that goal is the removal of Qaddafi (technically, this is NATO's goal, but the US has the same goal as a NATO member). While this is not exactly surprising, given the far-reaching history of US foreign policy, it is not smart either. The US has nothing to gain by ousting Qaddafi, but everything to lose by pursuing him with ground forces. Obama made a mistake by associating himself with the NATO objective: now, if NATO forces prove unwilling to accomplish it, he will look weak and ineffective. Obama should have vacated center stage to French Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy from the get-go. If NATO must go in after him, it should be regional powers like France that lead the way, not the US.
Before I conclude, I would also like to say that the most unfounded critique of Libyan intervention I have heard on various news outlets is the notion that now that Obama has made humanitarian intervention an essential part of his foreign policy he must also intervene in countries such as Sudan, Somolia, Democratic People's Republic of Congo, and the Ivory Coast. This notion is ridiculous. Not only would the US not be able to make a difference in any of these countries, intervention in these areas may actually worsen the current situations. Qaddafi's forces were bombed because Obama believed that such actions were capable of preventing bloodshed, not just because Qaddafi was a bad man. Obama has also been criticized for not intervening in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, even though there is civil unrest in these countries as well. But these countries are strategic allies in the war against Al-Qaeda. Selective morality is nothing new in the world of US foreign policy, and it is simply necessary to maintain strategic alliances.
On March 28th, an article in The Economist praised Obama's actions in Libya as "relatively extraordinary," saying, "He has in a mere 31 days since the protests started imposed powerful sanctions, frozen Colonel Qaddafi’s assets, secured a robust Security Council resolution, organised an international coalition, executed a near-flawless military campaign, rolled Colonel Qaddafi’s forces back to the west, taken out the colonel’s air defences and knocked out a good deal of his ground forces." Now, over a month later, this author may have changed his/her tune. Qaddafi is still holding on to power, and seems to be likely to do so as long as his bank account retains its weight. Still, while I wouldn't call Obama's Libyan intervention "extraordinary," I think he certainly made a shrewd foreign policy decision in a pinch. His emphasis on "humanitarian intervention" in a country with relatively few US interests, may liken him to his relatively unpopular predecessor, but his ability to avoid entanglement and promote multilateralism in this conflict proves he is at least logistically efficient.
Legalize It!
I recently read an interview with current US drug czar Gil Kerlikowske in the Texas Tribune (link at bottom of page) in which he cited a RAND corporation study in defense of his stance that legalizing marijuana in California would not help curb the violence in Mexico. Mr. Kerlikowske is a generally progressive drug czar who understands the benefits of preventative measures and a focus on treatment, but his harsh stance against legalization makes me think that he is not quite progressive enough.
The RAND corporation did find that legalizing marijuana in California would not significantly impact the drug violence in Mexico, but that is not because legalization is not an effective measure. The RAND study found that California accounted for 14 percent of national marijuana use and so legalizing it there would only cut drug export revenues of Mexican drug trafficking organizations by only 2 to 4 percent. However, the study also found that 15 to 26 percent of the total profits of Mexican drug trafficking organizations came from the sale of marijuana. That is to say, while legalization in California may not have such a huge effect on drug revenues, legalization on the national level just might. 15 to 26 percent would still leave Mexican drug cartels with billions of dollars in yearly revenue, but it is a significant difference. (A link to the study is included below)
We should also think of the costs to the US of the legalization of marijuana. I would argue that the costs would not be substantial. A study done in the early 2000s by economist Jon DiNardo found that marijuana and alcohol were substitute goods. That is to say, DiNardo found that past policies targeting marijuana consumption had increased alcohol consumption, and policies targeting alcohol consumption had increased marijuana consumption. The fact that excessive drinking causes around 80,000 deaths a year in the United States while marijuana causes virtually none means that the legalization of marijuana may actually have positive effects north of the Rio Grande.
http://www.texastribune.org/texas-news-media/tt-interview/tt-interview-with-drug-czar-gil-kerlikowske/
http://www.rand.org/news/press/2010/10/12.html
The RAND corporation did find that legalizing marijuana in California would not significantly impact the drug violence in Mexico, but that is not because legalization is not an effective measure. The RAND study found that California accounted for 14 percent of national marijuana use and so legalizing it there would only cut drug export revenues of Mexican drug trafficking organizations by only 2 to 4 percent. However, the study also found that 15 to 26 percent of the total profits of Mexican drug trafficking organizations came from the sale of marijuana. That is to say, while legalization in California may not have such a huge effect on drug revenues, legalization on the national level just might. 15 to 26 percent would still leave Mexican drug cartels with billions of dollars in yearly revenue, but it is a significant difference. (A link to the study is included below)
We should also think of the costs to the US of the legalization of marijuana. I would argue that the costs would not be substantial. A study done in the early 2000s by economist Jon DiNardo found that marijuana and alcohol were substitute goods. That is to say, DiNardo found that past policies targeting marijuana consumption had increased alcohol consumption, and policies targeting alcohol consumption had increased marijuana consumption. The fact that excessive drinking causes around 80,000 deaths a year in the United States while marijuana causes virtually none means that the legalization of marijuana may actually have positive effects north of the Rio Grande.
http://www.texastribune.org/texas-news-media/tt-interview/tt-interview-with-drug-czar-gil-kerlikowske/
http://www.rand.org/news/press/2010/10/12.html
The Death of Osama bin Laden: what does it mean?
This is my first blog post so far, so I decided I might as well make it about a relevant topic. The hot issue lately in the world of international affairs is the recent death of Osama bin Laden. This certainly is big news, especially for the United States.
The big question now is; what are the implications of his death? In one of his more serious moments, Jon Stewart (hardly a credible source in the world of international relations) remarked that "Al-Qaeda is finished" after bin Laden's death. Not quite. Bin Laden was more of a figurehead than a functional leader at the time of his death. However, the fact that bin Laden was still out there was a huge egg on the face of our military for the last ten years, so his death is certainly a relief in that sense.
Expressing a much more practical viewpoint, White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan has said that while Al-Qaeda is certainly not finished, bin Laden's death was a major step toward the administration's goal of "destroying" Al-Qaeda. This is true, but I take issue with the language. It is important that we realize that Al-Qaeda is not limited to any one country and because of this, the US will simply not be able to pursue it anywhere it goes. Al-Qaeda has followers in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia, and even countries like France and the United States (although there may not be concrete branches in either of these countries). While Al-Qaeda is a militaristic organization, it is not a military organization, and so it cannot be destroyed by military measures alone. In this sense, it is different than any foe the US Army has encountered, from the Nazi Wehrmacht to the Iraqi insurgency. Al-Qaeda is an ideological organization, and it must be destroyed by ideological means. That being said, the Arab Spring was far more successful toward the goal of destroying Al-Qaeda than any US military action ever could be.
So that is where Al-Qaeda stands. What about the US? There is much debate already about whether or not locating bin Laden has proven the effectiveness of enhanced interrogation techniques. We know that information on one of bin Laden's courier's is what led US forces to him, but the jury is still out on how exactly this intel was required (Attorney General Eric Holder has publicly said that he does not know). Andrea Prasow of Human Rights Watch has argued that the US may have found bin Laden sooner if enhanced interrogation had not been used, but unfortunately, this point is impossible to prove or disprove. The debate rages on, but if it is found that enhanced interrogation techniques were used in the investigation, Gitmo may not be closed down for a long, long time (look for upcoming Dick Cheney television appearances on this one).
And what about Pakistan? Bin Laden clearly had support from within Pakistan- he was not exactly in a cave in the tribal lands, as was originally thought after all. The US also executed this operation unilaterally without Pakistani aid, which points to some level of distrust between the two states. Pakistani president Zardari has denied that his government harbored bin Laden of course, but if Pakistani intelligence did not know of his whereabouts, it means that they are woefully inefficient as an investigative institution.
However, this does not signal a breakdown in US-Pakistani relations. While this may contribute to a heightened level of distrust between the two states, the US simply needs Pakistan too much to seriously consider a break in relations. Let us not forget that Pakistan is a nuclear-armed country, after all. The US should be concerned about the possible penetration of Pakistani intelligence by the Taliban, but unfortunately, this may be a problem that the US simply cannot fix.
The big question now is; what are the implications of his death? In one of his more serious moments, Jon Stewart (hardly a credible source in the world of international relations) remarked that "Al-Qaeda is finished" after bin Laden's death. Not quite. Bin Laden was more of a figurehead than a functional leader at the time of his death. However, the fact that bin Laden was still out there was a huge egg on the face of our military for the last ten years, so his death is certainly a relief in that sense.
Expressing a much more practical viewpoint, White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan has said that while Al-Qaeda is certainly not finished, bin Laden's death was a major step toward the administration's goal of "destroying" Al-Qaeda. This is true, but I take issue with the language. It is important that we realize that Al-Qaeda is not limited to any one country and because of this, the US will simply not be able to pursue it anywhere it goes. Al-Qaeda has followers in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia, and even countries like France and the United States (although there may not be concrete branches in either of these countries). While Al-Qaeda is a militaristic organization, it is not a military organization, and so it cannot be destroyed by military measures alone. In this sense, it is different than any foe the US Army has encountered, from the Nazi Wehrmacht to the Iraqi insurgency. Al-Qaeda is an ideological organization, and it must be destroyed by ideological means. That being said, the Arab Spring was far more successful toward the goal of destroying Al-Qaeda than any US military action ever could be.
So that is where Al-Qaeda stands. What about the US? There is much debate already about whether or not locating bin Laden has proven the effectiveness of enhanced interrogation techniques. We know that information on one of bin Laden's courier's is what led US forces to him, but the jury is still out on how exactly this intel was required (Attorney General Eric Holder has publicly said that he does not know). Andrea Prasow of Human Rights Watch has argued that the US may have found bin Laden sooner if enhanced interrogation had not been used, but unfortunately, this point is impossible to prove or disprove. The debate rages on, but if it is found that enhanced interrogation techniques were used in the investigation, Gitmo may not be closed down for a long, long time (look for upcoming Dick Cheney television appearances on this one).
And what about Pakistan? Bin Laden clearly had support from within Pakistan- he was not exactly in a cave in the tribal lands, as was originally thought after all. The US also executed this operation unilaterally without Pakistani aid, which points to some level of distrust between the two states. Pakistani president Zardari has denied that his government harbored bin Laden of course, but if Pakistani intelligence did not know of his whereabouts, it means that they are woefully inefficient as an investigative institution.
However, this does not signal a breakdown in US-Pakistani relations. While this may contribute to a heightened level of distrust between the two states, the US simply needs Pakistan too much to seriously consider a break in relations. Let us not forget that Pakistan is a nuclear-armed country, after all. The US should be concerned about the possible penetration of Pakistani intelligence by the Taliban, but unfortunately, this may be a problem that the US simply cannot fix.
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